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A recently identified natural resource-the or-
bit-spectrum-is at the center of an increasing
number of conflicts that have exposed the need
to revise the relevant regulatory system in light of
international legal principles. In determining
what kind of regulatory system is most appropri-
ate, there are three main levels of legal discussion.
First, examination of international legal princi-
ples reveals a basic framework for an effective reg-
ulatory regime. Yet, some principles are contra-
dictory; where contradictions occur-most nota-
bly between the principles of efficient utilization
and equitable access-this article argues that the
principle of efficient utilization ought to be given
greatest credence. Second, the discussion focuses
on whether an a posteriori system or an a priori sys-
tem is best supported by the legal principles. An a
posteriori system is essentially a first-in-time, first-in-
right method based on the publication, coordina-
tion and notification procedures of the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union ("ITU"); an a
priori system is a planned or engineered system
that allocates nominal orbital positions to various
countries, whether or not a country has an imme-
diate need or capability to use the position. This
article argues that the current a posteriori system is
the most appropriate. Third, accepting that the a
posteriori system is appropriate, the discussion then
revolves around possible revisions to the a posteri-
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DUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 47
(1996) [hereinafter KENNEDY & PASTOR].
2 Martin A. Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum
Allocation, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (1982) [hereinafter Roth-
blatt]. This is a scientifically derived, functionalist definition
that reflects how the dual nature of the resource dictates that
orbital-spectrum regulation considers both orbital position
and frequency.
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ori system. In doing so, this article proposes that
revisions should focus on the efficient utilization
of the orbit-spectrum, as can be best realized
through strong enforcement mechanisms and
stimulation of technological innovation.
As will be discussed in greater technical depth,
the limited orbit-spectrum resource' is exploited
through the simultaneous use of geostationary or-
bit ("GSO") and the electromagnetic spectrum,
which are both independently scarce resources.
2
The orbit-spectrum is one of society's valuable
natural resources. Through orbit-spectrum use,
artificial satellites provide numerous services to
society through many key functions including:
telecommunications, direct broadcasting and re-
mote sensing. The GSO is especially valuable be-
cause satellites in GSO, which appear stationary to
an observer on Earth, do not need to be tracked,
provide a continuous link to Earth stations and
are generally less expensive to operate than satel-
lites in other orbits.3 Arthur C. Clarke, a British
military officer and science fiction author,4 re-
ferred to the belief that three satellites placed
equidistant in GSO could provide for worldwide
communications "as the central nervous system of
mankind. '5 Not only do satellites perform vital
functions for contemporary society, but the satel-
lite industry is a rapidly growing sector of the
global economy.6
Along with the tremendous growth in the satel-
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CELLULAR AND SATELLITE SYSTEMS
130 (1996) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ].
4 Id. at 129.
5 RITA LAURIA WHITE & HAROLD M. WHITE, JR., THE LAW
AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COMMUNICATION 3
(1988) [hereinafter WHITE & WHITE]. Clarke used the phrase
in a speech at the signing of the Definitive Arrangements for
INTELSAT in 1971. Id.
6 £9 Million Programme to Boost British Satellite Communica-
tions Sector, INTERFORUM NEWS, at http://
www.interforum.org/news%202000/marn3.htm (Mar. 2,
2000) [hereinafter INTERFORUM].According to Interforum, it
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lite industry, orbit-spectrum conflicts have been
on the rise, stemming directly out of the scarce
nature of the orbit-spectrum. 7 For example,
PanAmSat Corp's PAS-4 satellite experienced in-
terference" from a Russian Stationary 20 satellite.
Although a spokesman for PanAmSat said that the
interference did not affect customers, the RtIs-
sians did not respond to initial requests from
PanAmSat to coordinate satellites. 9 In another in-
stance, APT Satellite of China experienced inter-
ference with its Apstar IA satellite allegedly
caused by a Palapa satellite used by Pasifik Satelit
Nusantara of Indonesia. Pasifik, however, accused
APT of moving a satellite into an orbital slot at
134 degrees E.L., which was already claimed by
Pasifik.' 0 Another conflict occurred when the Ma-
laysian Measat satellite was designed to operate on
a frequency that was already used by an Australian
satellite in close orbital proximity. Although the
problem was resolved just before launch, the Ma-
laysian owners were in favor of launching the sat-
ellite even if the problem was not resolved. l I In
another case, Asiasat of Hong Kong had "difficult
negotiations with Thailand trying to coordinate
satellites located at 77.5 and 78.5 degrees."'12 Be-
cause the distance between the satellites was likely
to cause "serious interference .. .Asiasat [ ] tried
to negotiate a technical solution even though it
claim[ed] first priority to the slot.""'
is estimated that by 2010 the "global satellite communica-
tions market is expected to be worth more than £ 140 billion
per year" ($200 billion based on conversion rate during Au-
gust of 200 1); see also UK Satellite Companies Receive Aid, SATEL-
LITE NEWS, Mar. 6, 2000, at Vol. 23 No. 10 (describing the
potential growth of the satellite industry).
7 NandasiriJasentuligara, Director of the U.N. Office for
Outer Space Affairs, in a speech given at the McGill Univer-
sity Institute of Air and Space Law, in 22 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 359 (1997) ("A problem that is sure to dramatically esca-
late disputes related to activities in outer space is that of the
growing shortage of suitable orbital slot positions for satel-
lites, especially in the GSO."). Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost
Connection: Geostationary Satellite Networks and the International
Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1095,
1125-29 (2000) [hereinafter Roberts] (analyzing developing
nations' efforts to secure greater access to GSO); see also Au-
drey L. Allison, Meeting the Challenges of Change: The Reform of
the International Telecommunications Union, 45 FED. COMM. L.J.
491, 495 (1993) [hereinafter Allison] (discussing developing
nations' demand for greater access to "ITU resources").
8 MARC A. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS ME-
DIA LAW 537 (1977) [hereinafter FRANKLIN]. Interference is a
distortion of a signal that occurs when satellites using the
same frequency are operating too close to each other. See text
infra pp. 210-11.
9 ITU System of Satellite Coordination Eroding Fast in Asia Pa-
Many orbit-spectrum conflicts occur because
the regulatory system is in need of further im-
provement. Not only has the current system led to
practical problems in orbit-spectrum use, but also
the way the system is designed has led to abuse.
For example, entities have exploited the current
regulatory system to traffic in orbital locations and
to file too many applications for limited orbital
positions. When this happens under an a priori sys-
tem, in which countries can reserve their own or-
bital positions, valuable orbit-spectrum goes un-
used or it may be used, but at a higher cost to the
end-user. A notable case of this problem is when
the Kingdom of Tonga, a small Pacific island na-
tion, registered for 16 GSO allotments with the
ITU.14 From 1988 to 1990, when Tonga made the
filings on behalf of Friendly Islands Communica-
tions ("Tongasat"), the ITU system permitted a
country15 to register a position for up to nine
years before a satellite was launched. 16 Tonga's ac-
tion "outraged" the international community be-
cause it "lacked a genuine need" for so many orbi-
tal allotments in the Pacific Rim portion of the
GSO.17 Tonga eventually withdrew its request for
ten of the sixteen allotments, and, in 1991, it ac-
quired six allotments.' But, Tongasat further an-
gered the international community by leasing one
allotment to Unicom, a Colorado company, and
auctioning off the remaining five allotments "for
cific, SPACE BUSINESS NEWS, Apr. 2, 1997, 1997 WL 8214983
[hereinafter ITU System of Coordination]. Coordination oper-
ates on a nation-to-nation system of espousal in which the
U.S. took PanAmSat's complaint to the Russian government.
Id.
10 Id.; see also Crowded Orbital Slots Test ITU's Influence,
SPACE NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, 1997 WL 9051757.
1 1 ITU System of Coordination, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 Id. In discussing the negotiations, Sabrina Cubbon, of
Asiasat, said that Asian operators are becoming increasingly
aggressive in disregarding the rules with "no intention of co-
ordinating. They just buy satellites and launch them." Id.
Also, according to an official of a U.S. satellite firm, "[t]he
operators in Asia are thumbing their nose at the ITU." Id.
14 Albert N. Delzeit & Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of
the Pacific Rim Orbital Spectrum Under International Space Law, 9
N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 69, 70 (1996) [hereinafter Delzeit & Beal].
15 Id. Tongasat was owned by Dr. Matt Nilson, an Ameri-
can entrepreneur, who retired in Tonga. Id. at 70-71; see also
Jannat C. Thompson, Space for Rent: The International Telecom-
munications Union, Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing, 62 J.
AIR L. & COM. 279, 280-81 (1996) [hereinafter Thompson].
16 ITU Aims for Stiffer Telecommunications Satellite Rules,
NIKKEI ENGLISH NEWS, Apr. 2, 1997, at *1.
17 Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 71.
18 Thompson, supra note 15, at 280-81.
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$2 million per year for each orbit."1 9 INTELSAT,
"the world's largest satellite operating consor-
tium," 20 claimed that Tongasat was engaging in
"financial speculation in the geo-stationary orbit"
in violation of ITU regulations.2 1 Columbia Com-
munications filed a petition with the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), which
"request[ed] that the FCC deny applications for
landing rights" 22 in the United States by any satel-
lite operated pursuant to an allotment leased
from Tongasat. 23 In response, Rimsat, Ltd., a
company which had leased one of Tongasat's al-
lotments, accused INTELSAT and Columbia Com-
munications of taking anti-competitive mea-
sures.24 The situation was further complicated
when Indonesia transferred its Palapa BI satellite
into an allotment already claimed by Tongasat.
25
This example of orbit-spectrum conflict reveals
the divergent opinions surrounding the regula-
tion of the orbit-spectrum. Because no clear
agreement exists among industry stakeholders, re-
form is particularly challenging. Yet, as this article
will demonstrate, international legal principles
provide guidance in reforming the orbit-spectrum
regulatory system.
As the regulatory system and legal principles
are discussed, reference will be made to the coor-
dination problems and the Tonga incident to bet-
ter illustrate the relevant legal issues. Prior to the
legal discussion, Section II describes the orbit-
spectrum's physical characteristics, and Section
III examines the regulatory system from its early
development to current structure. Section IV ad-
dresses the main legal issues and then the pro-
19 Id. at 281.
20 Id. INTELSAT, a private company as ofJuly 18, 2001, is
an international organization with 144 member countries.
Formed by treaty, INTELSAT originally provided satellite ser-
vices on a commercial basis and divided the profits among
member countries. In the mid 1990s, INTELSAT provided
nearly two-thirds of the world's telecommunications services.
Id. at 281 n.8; see also PanAmSat Corp., Comment, Market for
Satellite Communications and the Role of Intergovernmental Satellite
Organizations, submitted to the National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration, in Dkt. No.
000410098-0098-01 (May 8, 2000) available at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/occ/oecd2000/panamsat/
panamsat508.htm; see generally INTELSAT.com, at http://
www.intelsat.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2002) (INTELSAT's af-
filiate, New Skies Satellites, N.V., currently operates five satel-
lites); Newskies.com, at http;//www.newskies.com (last vis-
ited Sept. 18, 2001).
21 Thompson, supra note 15, at 280-81.
22 Id. at 281 n.10. Landing rights refer to permission for
satellites in certain positions to communicate with Earth sta-
posed revisions. These proposed revisions are im-
portant for improving the regulation of the orbit-
spectrum and have ramifications for space law in
general. Solving the current conflicts in the orbit-
spectrum by way of the international legal princi-
ples may encourage further exploration and com-
mercialization of space by showing that it is possi-
ble to establish legal regimes in space and by af-
firming legal principles that will be applicable to
other space ventures.
II. THE ORBIT-SPECTRUM RESOURCE
A. The GSO
The GSO was first identified by H. Noordwig,
an Austrian engineer who, in 1929, determined
that a satellite at an altitude of approximately
35,800 km above the equator would appear statio-
nary when viewed from Earth. 26 More precisely, a
satellite in GSO is located at 35,780 km above the
equator, which is 42,164 km from the center of
the Earth or a total of 6.61 Earth radii.27 A satel-
lite's velocity in GSO is equal to the Earth's veloc-
ity moving in an eastward direction. 28 The period
of the orbit of a satellite in GSO is one sidereal
day, which is 23 hours, 56 minutes and four
seconds.2 9 Any orbit with this period is called a
geosynchronous orbit and may be either elliptical
or inclined to an arbitrary degree; GSO specifi-
cally referred to herein is a special case of geosyn-
chronous orbit because it has a circular orbit and
no inclination above the equatorial plane.30 The
circumference of the orbit, which is necessary in
tions located in specific countries.
23 Id. at 281.
24 Id. at 282. Rimsat, Ltd. defended Tongasat in part be-
cause Rimsat had a financial interest in Tongasat's allot-
ments. Furthermore, at about the same time that Dr. Nilson,
the key founder of Tongasat, terminated his association with
Tongasat, he purchased more than 11% of Rimsat, Ltd.
stock. Tongasat's control of these orbital locations was in
Rimsat's and Dr. Nilson's financial interest. See Rick
Mendosa, Tongasat's Flawed Genius, *4-5, at http://
www.mendosa.com/tongasat.html (Dec. 30, 1996).
25 Thompson, supra note 15, at 282.
26 BRUNO PATAN, SATELLITE SYSTEMS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNOLOGIES 43 (1993) [hereinafter PATAN].
27 Id.
28 Id. This translates into a linear velocity of 3 km/s and
an angular velocity of 72.9 x 10-6 rad/s. Id.
29 Id. This is equal to 0.9973 solar days. Id.
30 PETER BERLIN, THE GEOSTATIONARY APPLICATIONS SAT-
ELLITE 54-55 (1988) [hereinafter BERLIN]. The eccentricity
and inclination are both zero in which a circle may be con-
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determining how many positions are available in
GSO, is 264,925 km. 31 Any satellite in this position
has a field of view of 42% of Earth's surface.3 2
In practice, however, the reality is never in har-
mony with the theory of how many satellites can
use an orbit because the satellites are subject to
various perturbing forces.33 There are triaxialities,
which are long-term, large-scale oscillations in
longitude due to longitude-dependent terms.34
There are the solar and lunar gravitational attrac-
tions.3 5 Also, solar radiation pressure exerts an in-
fluence on a satellite's motion and position in or-
bit.3 6 In order to keep satellites as close as possible
to their optimum positions in orbit, there is "sta-
tion keeping," which provides for corrections at
regular intervals .37 With improved station keeping
technology, smaller windows-the area in which a
satellite operates in orbit-can be maintained.38
The object of station keeping is to keep the satel-
lite in the window while using as little fuel as pos-
sible. 39 Typically, through the use of telecom-
mands or automatic commands for emergencies,
rocket thrusters make north-south corrections
every month and east-west corrections twice per
month.40 Current technology allows satellites to
remain in a window of 0.1 degree plus or minus in
sidered as a special form of an ellipse. An ellipse is generally
defined as a set of all points in a plane such that the sum of
all of the distances from two points in the plane, called the
foci, is constant. In the case of a circle, the two foci are in the
same position, the center of the circle. The eccentricity refers
to how close the foci are to each other. In a circle, the foci
are at the same point, and the eccentricity is thus zero. The
inclination refers to the angle in degrees as to how far off
from the equatorial plane a particular orbit is. GSO satellites
have an inclination of zero since they orbit on the equatorial
plane, having no angle relative to the equatorial plane.
CROSSWHITE ET AL., PRE-CALCULUS MATHEMATICS 262 (1988).
31 See PATTAN, supra note 26, at 43. Although the various
physical characteristics of satellites prevent defining the max-
imum number of satellites in the GSO, "physical interference
between satellites and radio frequency interference between
systems" demonstrate that GSO is a limited resource; see also
UMBERTO LEANzA, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNI-
CATIONS: THE LEGAL REGIME OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS BY GE-
OSTATIONARY-ORBIT SATELLITE 2243 (1993) [hereinafter LE-
ANZA],
32 See PATrAN, supra note 26, at 43.





37 JOHN T. GARNER & MALCOLM JONES, SATELLITE OPERA-
TIONS: SYSTEMS APPROACH TO DESIGN AND CONTROL 82
(1990).
38 Id.
longitude and in latitude, respectively. 41
Disregarding for the moment the effect electro-
magnetic spectrum has on orbit-spectrum, it is es-
timated that there are approximately 1800 orbital
slots of 0.2 degrees width available in GSO. 42 Gen-
erally, satellites are spaced one to two degrees
apart, but even if satellites were spaced at only 0.2
degrees, the probability that a collision would oc-
cur is extremely small.43 An Advisory Committee
for the ITU determined that if ten satellites, each
with a 100 square meter cross sectional area, were
placed in the same two degree nominal orbital
position, the risk of a collision would only be
0.00004% per year.44 Yet, despite the low risk of
collision with a separation of 0.2 degrees and the
trend to place satellites closer together with im-
proved technology and station keeping capabili-
ties, disputes arise over access to GSO because a
limited number of satellites can orbit in GSO;
4 5
however, demand for access to GSO is increas-
ing.
4 6
A greater risk for GSO collisions comes from
debris. From the moment a satellite is launched it
encounters harsh environments and begins to de-
teriorate. During the ascent into space there is vi-
olent acceleration, vibration, shock and decom-
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 LEANZA, supra note 31, at 2243. The 0.1 degree corre-
sponds with an area of space 150 km from north to south and
from east to west. The altitude of the satellites will typically
only vary within a space of 30 km; WHITE & WHITE, supra note
5, at 11.
42 See LEANZA, supra note 31, at 2243. The circular orbit,
360 degrees, is divided by 0.2 degrees. Id. Of course, larger
satellites in GSO would cause a reduction in the denomina-
tor. Such larger satellites could include manned space sta-
tions and solar-collecting satellites. The latter would be a sat-
ellite equipped with large solar panels to absorb solar energy.
The energy would be collected by photovoltaic cells, con-
verted into electric energy and transformed into microwave
power. A microwave beam would be transmitted to Earth,
where it would be collected and reconverted to electrical
power by an antenna-reflector array. To obtain a useful
amount of energy, the solar panels on the satellite would
need to measure in square kilometers. The potential amount
of energy would be between 2,000 and 15,000 Megawatts.
43 WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 12.
44 Id. That would equal one collision per 400,000 years.
45 Milton L. Smith, Space WARC 1985: The Quest for Equi-
table Access, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229 n.13 (1985) [hereinafter
Smith] (explaining that GSO is limited by volume, satellites
meeting specific orbital parameters, regulatory constraints
on frequency use and radio frequency interference).
46 Thompson, supra note 15, at 284-85 (explaining dis-
putes arising from developing nations' efforts to secure ac-
cess to GSO); Roberts, supra note 7, at 1125-29.
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pression. 47 Once the satellite enters its orbit, dif-
ferent parts of the satellite reach temperature ex-
tremes at the same time because there is no tem-
perature exchange through convection; the ex-
treme temperatures can cause structural stress.
48
Bombardment by cosmic particles causes electro-
static discharges that can "produce short or open
circuits and burn[ ] out electronic compo-
nents." 49 The effective operation of satellites may
be threatened by "lubricants evaporat[ing] in vac-
uum and caus[ing] moving parts to seize up"
50
and "paints and sealants perspir[ing] and
settl[ing] on sensitive optical surfaces."5' 1 Micro-
meteorites, which can strike satellites with tremen-
dous impact, pose a risk to their structural integ-
rity.52 A satellite may stop operating earlier than
expected for the simple reason that it may run out
of fuel. If a satellite does not succumb to these
threats, its life span is generally ten to fifteen
years.53
If the satellites were merely left in orbit, a seri-
ous problem of crowding GSO would occur. But
the general practice is to "dispose" of satellites by
either using the last bit of fuel to fire the satellite
out of orbit or by simply letting it drift out of orbit
once the fuel runs out.54 A satellite without fuel
cannot engage in station keeping, therefore it
drifts out of orbit.55 The first option of using the
remaining fuel to propel the satellite out of orbit
is preferred to the possible risks of collision if
satellites without fuel are permitted to drift out of
orbit.5 6 Yet, under these circumstances, the
probability for a collision is very low. 5 7 Although
debris in GSO poses a very small risk of collision
and the total number of orbital slots is currently
sufficient to reduce the risk of collision between
operating satellites, the fact remains that only a











58 FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 536.
59 FREDERICK E. TRINKLEIN, MODERN PHYSICS 286
(Teacher's ed. 1992) [hereinafter TRINKLEIN].
60 FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 536; TRINKLEIN, supra note
59, at 287 ("One thousand cycles per second equals one kilo-
cycle per second (1 KHz); 1,000 kilocycles per second equals
limited number of positions are available in GSO.
This is a real limitation to the GSO as a resource,
but the harnessing of the electromagnetic spec-
trum presents a greater limitation to orbit-spec-
trum use.
B. The Electromagnetic Spectrum
Electromagnetic spectrum refers to radiant en-
ergy waves resulting from periodic oscillations of
charged subatomic particles. 5s The electromag-
netic wave comprises an electric field and a mag-
netic field, where each field is at a right angle to
the direction of propagation. 59 Electromagnetic
waves are distinguished by frequency; frequency
refers to how many waves occur during a given pe-
riod of time and is measured in terms of cycles
per second or hertz. 60 The radio spectrum spans
from 10 KHz to 3000 GHz. 6 1 Yet, the most use of
the radio spectrum is confined to spectrum in the
10 KHz up to 40 GHz range.62 Even at lower fre-
quencies, starting at around 15 GHz, there is sig-
nificant technical difficulty because of attenua-
tion-the weakening of a signal-due to rain or
the constituent gases of the atmosphere.
63
The radio spectrum, as a resource, "has three
dimensions: space, time, and frequency."64 Two
spectrum users can transmit in the same space
and at the same time if one is using a frequency
different from what the other is using.65 If, how-
ever, two spectrum users occupy the same fre-
quency, these users must either transmit at vari-
ous times or in various spaces. 66 Transmission
with the same frequency in the same space and at
the same time causes interference.6 7 Interference
is the superposing6 8 of one wave onto another;69
often, it disrupts information that is carried on
one Megacycle per second (1 MHz); and 1,000 Megacycles
per second equals one Gigacycle per second (1GHz).").
Heinrich Hertz, a German experimental physicist whom the
Hertz is named after, in 1885, provided the experimental evi-
dence of the electromagnetic waves predicted by James Max-
well, a Scottish physicist, in 1865.
61 FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 536.
62 Id.
63 WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 15.
64 FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 536.
65 Thompson, supra note 15, at 311.
66 FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 537.
67 See id.
68 The Superposition Principle states that:
when two or more waves travel simultaneously through
the same medium 1) each wave proceeds independently
as though no other waves were present and 2) the resul-
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both waves. 70 Some interference can occur with
adjacent frequencies, but the greatest interfer-
ence problems occur with the use of the same fre-
quency.7 ' The extent to which interference will
occur primarily depends on the distance between
same-frequency transmissions and signal
strength.
72
The orbit-spectrum is a technology bound re-
source. 73 Yet, the technology is not predictably
bound by the resource; that is, even though there
are limits as to how much can be done with the
technology, room exists for further development.
The availability of this resource can be increased
through strategies and improved technology. For
example, technological developments allow satel-
lites to transmit far more information at a given
frequency than they could in the past.7 4 In addi-
tion, technological advancements allow use of V-
band frequencies.6 Also, for the better utilization
of the radio spectrum in light of its unique limita-
tions, several strategies have been undertaken in
operating satellites in GSO. GSO satellite frequen-
cies are divided into three main bands: the C-
band, the Ku-band, and the Ka-band. 76 Within
each band, the range of frequencies used for up-
link is different from the range used for down-link
communications, which ensures that a satellite
does not create interference with itself.77 When
two or more satellites operate on the same band,
sufficient distance between the satellites is neces-
sary to prevent their respective frequencies from
causing interference. Typically, satellites operat-
ing on the C-band have been spaced in incre-
ments of three to five degrees. 78 With the advent
tant displacement of any particle at a given time is the
vector sum of the displacements that the individual
waves acting alone would give it.
TRINKLEIN, supra note 59, at 244.
609 Id. at 691.
70 See FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 537.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Although technology can improve the quality of water
and facilitate extraction and transportation of it, water, un-
like spectrum, is inherently a resource that can be exploited
without advanced technology.
74 WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 15.
75 FCC Adopts V-Band Spectrum Plan, COMM. TODAY, Dec.
18, 1998, LEXIS, Communications News Stories. In the
United States, frequencies designated to the V-band are at
36.0-51.4 GHz. Id.
76 Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 57 & n.6.
77 Id. Up-links are signals from the Earth station to the
satellite; down-links are signals from the satellite to the Earth
station. For the C-band, 5.925-6.425 GHz is the up-link, and
of improved antenna design, however, satellites
operating in the C-band are being spaced as close
together as two degrees. 79 Satellite service provid-
ers favor use of C-band because the technology
for this band is the most tested, least expensive
and least susceptible to rain and atmospheric at-
tenuation.80 Improvements in the technology for
the higher frequency bands, including the Ku-
and Ka-bands, allow service providers to use these
bands more than they have in the past.8 1 Satellites
using the Ku-band are usually placed in between
C-band satellites, so as to make use of the space
necessarily left vacant for avoiding interference
between C-band satellites. Increasingly, though,
there are more hybrid satellites, which operate on
both C- and Ku-band frequencies.8 2 Frequency
band distribution and decisions on satellite signal
strength involve unilateral actions of nations and
corporations, bilateral and regional agreements
and, most importantly, the ITU's regulatory sys-
tem. This regulatory system and its interplay with
other stakeholders shape the legal debate sur-
rounding the use of the orbit-spectrum resource.
III. THE REGULATORY SYSTEM
A. History
The ITU plays the central role in regulating the
use of the orbit-spectrum resource. From its roots
in 1865, as the International Telegraph Union
("Telegraph Union"), the ITU has undergone nu-
merous transformations as the technological and
political landscapes have evolved.8 3 Twenty Euro-
3.7-4.2 GHz is the down-link; for the Ku-band, 14.0-14.5
GHz is the up-link, and 11.7-12.7 GHz is the down-link; and,
for the Ka-band, 27.5-31.0 GHz is the up-link, and 17.7-21.2
GHz is the down-link. Id at 57 n.6.
78 See WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 15.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. Broadband satellite service providers, such as
EchoStar and DirecTV, are using these higher frequencies.
Armand Musey, Dollars and Sense: Broadband: The Next Big
Thing?, VIA SATELLITE, June 10, 2001, LEXIS, Communica-
tions News Stories; Theresa Foley, The World's Hottest Real Es-
tate: Orbital Slots Are Prime Property, VIA SATELLITE, Sept. 10,
2001, LEXIS, Communications News Stories.
82 See, e.g., PANAMASAT.COM, GALAXY XI, at http://
www.panamsat.com./globalnetwork/galaxy-Il.asp (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2002). For example, PanAmSat has a number of
operational hybrid C/Ku-Band satellites, such as the Galaxy
XI at 91 degrees W.L. Id.
83 WHrrIE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 51 & tbl.2.1.
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pean nations established the Telegraph Union to
universalize their telegraph services.8 4 The Tele-
graph Union did not immediately regulate devel-
oping communications technologies. For exam-
ple, even though the telephone was invented in
the 1870s, the Telegraph Union did not do seri-
ous work on issues relating to telephone service
until 1903.85 In that same year, the Preliminary
Radio Conference set in motion the framework
for what would later become the International Ra-
diotelegraph Union ("Radio Union"). Established
in 1927, the Radio Union's early worked focused
on allocating radio frequencies.
8 6
In 1932, the Telegraph Union and the Radio
Union merged into the ITU, at which point the
debate over radio frequency allocation 7 and in-
terference was already substantial. 8 In 1947, the
ITU underwent a major reorganization of its
structure, including an affiliation with United Na-
tions as a specialized agency.8 9 Shortly thereafter,
with the launch of Sputnik on Oct. 4, 1957, the
ITU began to work on issues relating to satellite
communications. Commemorating this historic
event, the United Nations issued a General Assem-
bly Resolution that emphasized, among other
things, that outer space exploration and use
ought to further the common interest of mankind
and peace.90 In 1992, the ITU approved an inter-
nal reorganization plan to keep pace with rapid
international communications technology devel-
opment; the changes became official on July 1,
1994.91 Currently, the ITU has 189 members
92





87 Id. at 52. Allocation refers to the designation of spe-
cific frequencies to particular services. See infra Part Il1, C.
88 Id. at 47-49.
89 Id. at 53 & tbl.2.1.
90 Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Commu-
nication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Treaty and "Pur-
poseful Purposes", 60 J AIR L. & COM. 237, 301, 326 n.340
(quoting from Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, G.A. Res. 1962 U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., (1963)).
91 See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 31. Changes
include creating permanent "sectors" that periodically meet
to discuss matters and make changes within their respective
fields. The following are some of the sectors: radiocommuni-
cation, telecommunications and telecommunications devel-
opment. Id. at 32. During the reorganization, the former In-
B. The ITU Infrastructure
The ITU is governed by a constitution, which is
supplemented by the International Telecommuni-
cations Convention ("ITC"). 93 Both documents,
which define the rights and obligations of mem-
ber states, are binding on the ITU. 94 Every four
years, the Plenipotentiary Conference meets to es-
tablish "longterm policy, elect[ ] officers, set[]
the budget, amend[ ] the Convention, and
elect[ ] the 41 members of the Council," which
then meets every year for policymaking. 95 The Of-
fice of the Secretary-General, which is led by the
Secretary-General, performs ITU's daily adminis-
trative work.9 6 In addition, various sectors carry
out more detailed work in specific issue areas.
One important sector is the ITU-Radiocommuni-
cation sector, which is supervised by the World
Radiocommunication Conference ("WRC").
Meeting every two years, the WRC oversees techni-
cal work on radio spectrum use and makes impor-
tant decisions on how orbital positions and fre-
quencies are allocated. 97 The various sectors im-
plement the ITU's Administrative Regulations,
which include the Radio Regulations. The Radio
Regulations, established in 1963, provide for the
allocation of radio frequencies, maintenance of a
Table of Frequency Allocations, and "assignment
of orbital positions and radio frequencies for
satellites."9 8 The basic structure of the Radio Reg-
ulations for space services is similar to terrestrial
radio regulations; however, the space regulations
are "more complex" than their terrestrial counter-
part.99 Since their initial promulgation, the Radio
ternational Frequency Registration Board was changed to the
Radio Communications Service. Thompson, supra note 15, at
289.
92 ITU.INT, OVERVIEW, at http://www.itu.int/members/
index.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
93 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 32.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. The current Secretary-General is Mr. Yoshio Ut-
sumi, who was elected to the position on Oct. 20, 1998. The
Secretary-General takes a leadership role in administering
the ITU's duties and guiding policy. The Secretary General's
duties are defined in Article 11 of the ITU Constitution and
Article 5 of the ITU Convention. ITU.INT, OFFICE OF THE SEC,
RETARY GENERAL, at http://www.itu.int/osg/ (last visited Feb.
3, 2002).
97 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 32.
98 Id. at 33.
99 See WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 97.
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Regulations for space have undergone many
changes. 100 While some ITU Administrative Regu-
lations are not binding on member states, all the
Radio Regulations "are treaty undertakings" bind-
ing on member states.' 10
Creating the International Frequency Registra-
tion Board was one of the most important steps in
the ITU's efforts to manage radio frequency use.
The Board's functions have remained the same
since its establishment in 1947; however, its name
was changed to the Radio Regulations Board
("RRB"). Although the RRB does not have judi-
cial power, it is characterized as a quasi-judicial
body. 0 2 RRB is quasi-judicial in that it authorita-
tively interprets the Radio Regulations and their
application to specific assignments. 0 3 Beyond this
role, however, the RRB does not have enforce-
ment power. Nevertheless, RRB decisions are con-
sidered "persuasive evidence of the international
law embodied in the [binding] Radio Regula-
tions."'1 4 The RRB comprises of five "technically
trained" individuals who are experienced with the
particular region they represent. '115RRB members
are elected by the Plenipotentiary, which also ap-
points the RRB Director.
10 6
C. Regulatory Substance and Procedure
The current regulatory system employs a two-
track approach. The first track, an a posteriori sys-
tem, is used for orbit-spectrum use in the C- and
Ku-bands. The second track uses an a priori sys-
tem, which was designed for the emerging Ka-
band and Broadcasting Satellite Services. Al-
though coordination problems certainly occur in
using the C- and Ku-bands, the significant con-
cerns surrounding the use of an a priori system
stem from the ITU's regulation of the Ka-band
and Broadcasting Satellite Services. At the same
time, neither the a posterioi nor the a priori track
100 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, 32.
101 Id. at 33.
102 WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 86.
103 Id.
104 Id. (explaining that RRB interpretations are given
such weight because nations are required to cooperate and
they "prefer to resolve disputes without primary reliance
upon binding arbitral or judicial processes").
105 Id.
106 Id. at 96; see also ITU.INT, ELECTED OFFICIALS, at http:/
/www.itu.int/officials/jones/index.html (last visited on Feb.
3, 2002) (stating that the current Director of the RRB is Mr.
Robert Jones, who was elected to the position in September
raises entirely distinct issues surrounding use of
the orbit-spectrum because the same interna-
tional legal principles apply to both systems.
Whether an applicant follows the a posteriori or
the a priori track, the frequencies of the radio
spectrum must first be allocated. This complex
process involves dividing radio spectrum into
blocks of frequencies that ultimately are used by
specific services. '0 7 For example, the ITU has allo-
cated certain frequencies for radio broadcasting,
maritime navigation, radar, satellite communica-
tions and radio astronomy. 0 More specifically,
the ITU has allocated the C-, Ku- and Ka-bands, a
frequency block ranging from 3.7 GHz to 31.0
GHz, for satellite communications.'0 9
Once the spectrum has been allocated, the next
step, identification of the entity that will provide
the services for the allocations, is where the ITU's
and the RRB's tasks become more complex and
more controversial. After allocation, the fre-
quency is either allotted or assigned. 10 Allotment
describes the process where a block of frequen-
cies or orbital positions''' is dedicated to a spe-
cific country or geographical region.12 Assign-
ment, on the other hand, refers to a nation, re-
gional organization or the ITU deciding which
company or country can use a certain frequency
for the allotted service. Allotment, and the subse-
quent national assignment, works well for local-
ized services. Direct international allotment and
assignment by the ITU, however, are better suited
for international services. 1' For example, the
ITU has allocated a specific portion of the spec-
trum for commercial radio services. This allocated
block of frequencies is then allotted to countries,
and the countries assign specific frequencies to in-
dividual radio stations. International allotment,
on the other hand, requires the international or-
ganization, the ITU in this case, to directly allot
and assign frequency and orbital positions to the
of 1994).
107 FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 540.
108 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 48. Although allo-
cated categories have been established, much overlap occurs
among users of popular frequencies. Id. Additionally, coun-
tries may record their reservations with the ITU to make ex-
ceptions for use within certain frequencies. Id.
109 Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 57 & n.6.
110 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 48.
''' Id.
112 Id. at 48-49.
11-1 Id. at 49.
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requesting country or company.' 1 4
Prior to 1988, the ITU used an a posteriori sys-
tem, 1 5 but, as of 1988, the ITU has used a two-
track system, where the satellite service provider
either acquires an assignment directly from the
ITU or from a country that has received an allot-
ment." 6 The frequency the provider hopes to op-
erate on defines whether assignment is acquired
from the ITU or a country. The first track, which
was used exclusively until 1988, is an a posteriori
system applicable to the C- and Ku-bands.1 17 It is,
essentially, a first-come-first-served system, in
which the ITU officially recognizes the use of a
specific orbit and frequency so long as the pro-
vider complies with applicable ITU require-
ments. 118 When a provider seeks rights to operate
on a frequency pursuant to the a posteriori track
(assignment from the ITU), it must fulfill three
necessary steps established in Radio Regulations,
Articles 11 and 13: advance publication, coordina-
tion and notification.' 19
Advance publication entails the service provider
submitting technical information on the satellite
system to the ITU. 120 This information is supple-
mented by "due diligence" information, which in-
cludes identification of the satellite network and
operator and evidence of contracts providing for
the manufacturing of the satellite and launch ser-
vices. 12 1 At this time, the ITU does not have the
authority to verify the information provided.'
22
Advance publication must be provided at least two
years before the beginning of the satellite service
and, at the earliest, five years before the imple-
mentation of the satellite service.' 23 The ITU may
grant a two-year extension if the provider timely
submits the due diligence information and justi-
fies the extension on any of the following
grounds: launch failure or a delay beyond the
provider's control; delays caused by design modi-
fications that are required by coordination agree-
ments; problems in meeting design specifications;
114 Thompson, supra note 15, at n.48.
115 Id. at 295.
116 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 49.
117 Thompson, supra note 15, at 294-95, 297-98 &
n.136.
118 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 49.
119 Id. at 58.
120 Thompson, supra note 15, at 298.
121 Roberts, supra note 7, at 1121, 1130-31. The new due
diligence requirement is aimed at dissuading actions similar
to Tonga's creation of "paper satellites."
122 Id_
delays in establishing coordination; or, financial
circumstances that are beyond the provider's con-
trol. 12 4 If the service provider satisfies these re-
quirements, the ITU then provides advance publi-
cation of the assignment in a weekly bulletin,
which notifies other providers and leads to the
next step in the a posteriori track.' 2
5
The second and most difficult step is coordina-
tion. During coordination, providers of existing
satellite systems and the provider of the new sys-
tem must ensure that no interference will occur
between the systems. But for coordination to take
place, providers of existing service must contact
the new provider within four months after ad-
vance publication.' 26 If the provider does not ex-
pect any interference, no coordination is re-
quired.' 27 This process often requires a tremen-
dous amount of negotiation and technical adjust-
ments, and it may take several years.1
2 8
The third step, notification, occurs after ad-
vanced publication and coordination. So long as
the ITU does not find any technical problems in
the providers' agreements, it will register-or offi-
cially list-the orbital slot and frequency assign-
ment in the Master International Frequency Reg-
ister.' 29 This provides the operator with the legal
rights to use the orbital location and frequencies
when the satellite system becomes operational. If,
however, the satellite system is not registered or
even if it is registered but not operational within
the required time periods the whole process is
cancelled and the orbital location becomes availa-
ble to other providers. 130 Once notification oc-
curs and the system is operational, the assignment
is entitled to "international recognition" and legal
protection.'"'
The second track, the a priori system, is applica-
ble to fixed satellite services in the Ka-band. 32 An
a priori system is a planned, or engineered, system
in which the ITU allots a "nominal" orbital slot
with a certain arc or a portion of the GSO to each
123 Id.
124 Id. Previously, the time periods were six and three
years, which totals nine years. The new time requirements
are also meant to combat the creation of "paper satellites."
125 See Thompson, supra note 15, at 298.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 58.
129 Thompson, supra note 15, at 298.
130 Id.
13' Id.
132 See id. at 297, 311 & n.136.
20021
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
member state. 133 When a provider wishes to use a
nominal slot, it must seek assignment from the
member country.-' 4 If the country makes the as-
signment to the service provider, the nominal po-
sition may be adjusted to a real position within
the arc. 135 When the a priori system was imple-
mented, however, providers generally did not use
the Ka-band because the technology for commer-
cial use was not readily available.' 3 6 Recently an
increasing number of satellites using the Ka-band
have been launched, and the FCC has granted ad-
ditional licenses for Ka-band satellites to satellite
companies. 1
37
Despite these efforts to use spectrum assigned
pursuant to the a priori track, service providers
have used the a posteriori track far more than the a
priori track. 1 38 The primary reason for this action
is that service providers are accustomed to using
the C- and Ku-bands, which are assigned pursuant
to the a posteriori track, and their technology was
developed for use of these bands. Yet, the a priori
track cannot be viewed merely as a theoretical
matter; it is the track used for a numerous emerg-
ing services, making it a critical concern with re-
spect to the debate on applying international le-
gal principles to the regulation of satellites.
IV. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
In order to better comply with the legal frame-
work of the orbit-spectrum while considering the
unique nature of the orbit-spectrum resource, fur-
ther revision to ITU regulations is necessary. The
controversy-and need for revision-may be ex-
133 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 58. Although
under development since 1947, the a priori system in 1988
was still only practically implemented for a brief time and for
a few services. See id. at 49; see also WrITE & WHIrE, supra note
5, at 90.
134 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 58.
135 Id.
136 See Thompson, supra note 15, at 295, 311 & n.117.
Creating an a priori system for the Ka-band may be viewed as
a political gesture to appease the developing countries be-
cause they had little chance to develop the capabilities to use
the Ka band. Id. at 295-96 & n.1 18. Operation at the C band,
the most popular, uses a cheap and developed technology,
but is subject to the a posteriori system. Id.
137 Milestones Loom for Winners of Ka-band Spectrum in Long-
Delayed Second Round, SATELLITE NEWS, Aug. 6, 2001, LEXIS,
Communications News Stories. In Aug. 2001, the FCC re-
leased the second round assignments for orbital locations
and Ka-band frequencies. Id.
138 Thompson, supra note 15, at 297.
139 Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 61.
amined at three main levels. First, there are ten-
sions between various legal principles. Second, in
light of the legal principles there is the debate on
whether to move toward a regulatory system pri-
marily based on the a posteriori track ("an a posteri-
ori system") or move to a system based on the a
priori track ("an a priori system"). Third, if the ITU
should move towards an a posteriori system, as this
article argues, what steps can be taken to improve
it? In the following pages, the tensions between
legal principles will be explained to underscore
why these principles support an a posteriori system,
particularly based on efficient utilization, while
paying due regard to the other principles, most
notably equitable access. Finally, Section V recom-
mends revisions for the current a posteriori system,
some of which hint toward a future hybrid system.
Two sources establish the legal framework for
regulation of the orbit-spectrum: the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Space
Treaty") and the ITC. I3 Both the Space Treaty
and the ITC are binding on member countries,
which include all developed countries and many
developing countries. The two treaties create a
foundation for the international law of the orbit-
spectrum resource. 
1 40
The Space Treaty became effective in 1967 and
contains many broad principles, which guided the
development of subsequent instruments of space
law and provided grounds for resolving con-
flicts. 1 1 Because of the broad nature of the prin-
ciples promulgated in the Space Treaty, the im-
140 Libya v. Malta, 1985 l.C.J. 13, 29-30 (stating "multilat-
eral conventions may have an important role to play in re-
cording and defining rule from custom, or indeed in devel-
oping them"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §102(1) (1987) (providing
that "international law is one that has been accepted as such
by" custom, international agreement or derivation from gen-
eral principles). Of the three sources, conventions and cus-
tom are the most widely recognized sources because the gen-
eral principles derived from them have been absorbed into
customary international law. Although the conventions can-
not directly bind nonmember parties, they aid the develop-
ment of customary international law, which could then bind
non-member parties. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G.
MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 16, 25-26 (1989) [herein-
after BUERGENTHAL & MAIER]. Conventions, including the
Space Treaty and the ITC, are honored "pacta sunt servanda"
by the member parties. Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 75.
141 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
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plementation of these principles operates as both
a blessing and curse. The breadth of these princi-
ples provides for tremendous flexibility, which has
been both beneficial and frustrating, depending
on which side of the technological divide one is
situated. Nonetheless, the Space Treaty142 provi-
sions relevant to the legal dispute and regulatory
debate over use of the orbit-spectrum are Articles
1, 11 and IX. 14 3 The activities of signatories to the
Space Treaty are constrained by it and the ITC.1
44
The ITC contains the stated goals of the ITU and
specifies what measures ought to be taken to
achieve those goals. 145 If similar principles are
consolidated, the following legal duties-some of
which overlap-guide the use of the orbit-spec-
trum: restriction on national appropriation; equi-
table access while considering the special needs of
developing countries; cooperation with due re-
gard for corresponding interests; and efficient
and economic operation.
As may already be evident, contradictions exist
between the legal principles set forth in the Space
Treaty and the ITC. These contradictions are
practically manifested in the regulatory system of
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 201, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 386
(1967) [hereinafter Space Treaty]. Subsequent conventions
include: Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S.
119; Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961
U.N.T.S. 197; Convention on the Registration on Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695,
1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; U.N GAOR,
34th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979); see gen-
erally Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A Critical
Look at the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 345, 345 (1995) [hereinafter
Keefe].
142 Eric Husby, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer
Space, 3J. Irr'L L. & PRAc. 359, 361-65 (1994) [hereinafter
Husby]. The Space Treaty developed from two earlier trea-
ties, the Antarctic Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty. Id. at 362.
143 Space Treaty, supra note 141, at art. I, II, IX.
The exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespec-
tive of their degree of economic or scientific develop-
ment, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in
accordance with international law, and there shall be
free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
Id. at art. I. "Outer Space, including the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by
the orbit-spectrum resource. Most noticeably, the
debate is strongest between the developed and de-
veloping countries. The developed countries gen-
erally advocate the principle of efficient and eco-
nomic operation (efficient utilization), whereas
the developing countries are most supportive of
the principle of equitable access. Subsequently, as
will be discussed, the way the principles are inter-
preted determine what system they support; con-
sequently, this leads to what type of system the
countries will support, depending on their level of
development. The actual debate between coun-
tries operates primarily at a political level that
conveniently uses the various principles to pro-
mote the respective interests of the developed
and developing countries, including their constit-
uents. Yet, the debate on the regulatory system's
future will not become mired in political and le-
gal wrangling so long as stakeholders keep in
mind that orbit-spectrum is a delicately balanced
resource, that the operation of two nearby satel-
lites on the same frequency will result in interfer-
ence for both parties and that an increasing num-
ber of satellites are launched into GSO. The care-
any other means." Id. at art. II.
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the
Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation
and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activi-
ties in outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding inter-
ests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.
Id. at art. IX.
144 GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P MERGES, OUTER
SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 200 (1989) [hereinafter
REYNOLDS & MERGES] (explaining that the ITC, originally en-
acted at the 1932 Madrid Conferences, is periodically
amended); WHITE & WHITE, supra note 5, at 47.
145 Allison, supra note 7, at 504, 514 & n.48. ITC art. 1
provides that ITU's purpose is "[t]o promote the develop-
ment of technical facilities and their most efficient opera-
tion;" "to harmonize the actions of the nations in the attain-
ment of those ends," "[t]o maintain and extend international
cooperation between all Members of the Union for the im-
provement and rational use of telecommunications of all
kinds, as well as to promote and offer technical assistance to
developing countries." To achieve these goals, ITC art. 4 calls
on the ITU "to coordinate efforts to eliminate harmful inter-
ference between radio stations of different countries and to
improve the use made of the radio frequency spectrum." ITC
art. 12 establishes ITU's duty "to effect allocation of the radio
frequency spectrum and registration of radio frequency as-
signments in order to avoid harmful interference... "Finally,
ITC art. 33, as amended in 1989, directs the ITC to "take into
account the special needs of the developing countries" in




fully constructed language of each instrument
should not be considered as a mere tool for politi-
cal and pecuniary gain, but, more importantly, as
the ideals from which rational solutions will de-
velop. 146 With the unique nature of the orbit-spec-
trum resource and the established legal principles
in mind, it is possible to construct a workable sys-
tem that looks towards the future. The next sec-
tion demonstrates that the most relevant legal
principles give more support to an a posteriori sys-
tem than an a priori system. The next section will
also demonstrate that the equitable access princi-
ples do not necessitate an a priori system because
these principles can be reflected in an a posteriori
system. The following section concludes by argu-
ing that, even though an a posteriori system is pre-
ferred, this system needs revision.
A. Restriction on National Appropriation
A fundamental goal of the Space Treaty is the
elimination of "sovereignty" claims in outer
space. 147 However, a strict reading of the Space
Treaty's text reveals some ambiguity as to the sig-
natories' intent on this issue. Although the Space
Treaty prevents national sovereignty claims, it
does not unequivocally preclude appropriation by
private individuals, companies or international or-
ganizations. Article 2 only provides that outer
space is "not subject to national appropriation."14
The Space Treaty can be interpreted as allowing
private appropriation because where the signato-
ries intended to bar appropriation, they clearly
did so. Thus, it can be inferred from the absence
of such a bar, with respect to private appropria-
tion, that the signatories were not opposed to the
private appropriation of outer space. However,
Article 2 refutes this argument, stating that na-
tional appropriation "shall not" be served "by any
146 Smith, supra note 45, at 247-54 (analyzing the policy
implications of ambiguity in defining the terms "planned"
and "plan" in the ITC's equitable access provisions).
147 Husby, supra note 142, at 359, 361-62.
148 Keefe, supra note 141, at 358-59 (quoting Professor
S. Gorove, Vice President of the International Space Insti-
tute, that "[a]t present, an individual acting on his own be-
half or on behalf of another individual or a private associa-
tion or an international organization could lawfully appropri-
ate any part of outer space"); see also Glenn H. Reynolds,
Space Law in the 1990s: An Agenda for Research, 31 JURIMETERICS
J. 1, 5 (1990) (explaining that Professors Reynolds and
White's argument that appropriation by private parties is law-
ful).
149 Husby, supra note 142, at 362.
other means." 149 This argument advanced by Arti-
cle 2 provides that every individual or company
that makes use of the orbit-spectrum is a national-
ity of a given country.' 5 Thus, a private owner-
ship claim is viewed as an extension of national
sovereignty. If that country in any way recognizes
or supports the actions of a private company or its
claims, state action may be found. 15 ' Moreover,
barring private ownership claims precludes a na-
tion from intentionally using a private entity to af-
fect an appropriation.
Although strong legal grounds exist for recog-
nizing that outer space is not subject to traditional
property rights, it also may be forcefully argued
that traditional property rights should be recog-
nized in outer space. If property rights in outer
space remain unrecognized, fewer incentives may
exist to explore and exploit the resources of outer
space. The need to create incentives in outer
space is analogous to grants of property rights to
promote the development of the American
West.' 52 Nonetheless, until such policies are trans-
lated into new international agreements or cus-
tomary international law, outer space will be
viewed in terms of res communis in which nations
cannot appropriate a given area in space, but na-
tions or private parties may fully exploit the re-
sources in that given area. 15 - As on the high seas,
where no exclusive property rights attach to fish-
ing concerns, orbit-spectrum use within the GSO
does not create an ownership right to the area of
space. Instead, application of res communis allows
for the exclusive exploitation of natural resources
at that location and at that time.'
5 4
In regulating the orbit-spectrum, the a posteriori
system better complies with the legal principle of
res communis by recognizing the ancient "first-in-
time, first-in-right" principle, 15 5 which is analo-
gous to res communis application to the high
150 Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, passim (analyzing
Tonga incident in terms of both Tonga's and Tongasat's con-
duct).
151 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp.2d 1294,
1305 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (explaining that a court will look to
various factors to determine whether state action is impli-
cated: public function, state compulsion, nexus and joint ac-
tion).
152 REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 144, at 164.
153 See Husby, supra note 142, at 365.
154 Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 68 & n.81.
155 Richard A. Epstein, Stranahan Lecture: Property Rights
Claims of Indigenous Populations: The View from the Common Law,
31 U. TOL. L. REX,. 1, 4 (1999) (explaining the literal and
common translation of "qui prior est tempore potior est
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seas. 156 Thus, the party that first exploits the orbit-
spectrum is entitled to use it. Moreover, ITU regu-
lations support this entitlement by requiring the
providers of a new satellite to coordinate with the
providers of operational satellites in nearby posi-
tions.
1 5 7
An a priori system, in contrast to the a posteriaori
system, would allow for regulations that resemble
national appropriation. In the a priori system,
nominal assignments of orbital positions would es-
sentially give each country exclusive property
rights to the GSO without the actual exploitation
of the resource, which is necessary under res com-
munis. Countries would be permitted to follow
Tonga's actions in leasing GSO allotments for
profit as if they had property rights in the allot-
ments. Although Tonga's actions occurred under
the current a posteriori regulations, such practices
are likely to proliferate under an a priori system.
Furthermore, Tonga's exploitation of the GSO, as
if it had an ownership interest, contravenes inter-
national legal principles and highlights the need
to further revise the regulatory system of the orbit
spectrum.
B. Balancing Equitable Access With the
Particular Needs of Developing Countries'
Although equitable access principles provide
for "fairness and justice [by] taking all relevant
circumstances into consideration," equitable ac-
cess does not mandate equal results.' 58 At the urg-
ing of developing countries, equitable access con-
siderations were incorporated into the ITC in
1973.159 Developing countries were concerned
that the existing a posteriori system operated to
their detriment because developed nations satu-
rated the more desirable C-band and a developing
country's deployment of its own satellite system
was "prohibitively expensive."'' 61 These concerns
jure").
156 See Ghen v. Rich, 8F. 159, 162 (D. Mass. 1881) (hold-
ing that the party which first marked a whale for capture had
a priority right to the whale).
157 Malaysia's Binariang Woried INTELSAT Satellite Too
Close, ASIA PULSE, July 8, 1997, LEXIS, Communications News
Stories. Regarding a conflict over orbit-spectrum use, Haniff
Omar, chairman of Binaiang Sdn Bhd, owner of the Measat-
1 satellite, said, "We already have that slot ... it is up to the
newcomer to discuss with the incumbent. When a newcomer
comes into the scene, it has to take the matter up with the
ITU and coordinate with all owners of satellites in the sur-
rounding areas." Id.
158 Smith, supra note 45, at 237 (arguing that equitable
over C-band saturation and the increasing costs
for developing other bands are legitimate.'61
However, ameliorating these concerns does not
demand implementation of an a priori system.
The principle of equitable access is generally
agreed to be a concept of "equal legal opportu-
nity." 162 Under the current a posteioi system every
country has an equal right and opportunity to use
orbit-spectrum. If a particular country does not
have the financial and technological resources im-
mediately available to use the orbit-spectrum, it is
not necessarily the responsibility of the developed
countries to provide enhanced opportunity. 163 In-
deed, the idea of equal legal opportunity arises
only when a country is ready to use orbit-spec-
trum. 164 When the country is ready to use orbit-
spectrum, the issue that arises is whether to recog-
nize the special needs of developing countries in
their use of the orbit-spectrum. These special
needs may include the acceptance that a develop-
ing country's use of orbit-spectrum may not be as
efficient or economic as use by a developed coun-
try. 165 Thus, the principle of equitable access cer-
tainly does not require reservation of positions for
developing countries through an a priori system; it
only requires recognition and acceptance that de-
veloping countries may use orbit-spectrum less ef-
ficiently.
In addition, the Space Treaty's "benefit for all
countries" clause does not require the creation of
an a priori system or the direct sharing of benefits
on a regulated basis in order to create equitable
access. When the Space Treaty was signed and rat-
ified, there was some concern as to the meaning
of this declaration. When the United States Sen-
ate ratified the treaty, the Committee on Foreign
Relations stated "that nothing in Article 1 . . .di-
minishes or alters the right of the United States to
determine how .. .it shares the benefits and re-
access "implies fairness and justice, taking all relevant cir-
cumstances into consideration").
159 Id.
160 Id. at 232-34.
161 Id. at 232-33 & n.14-15. Predictions on when the C-
band will be saturated have varied from it already having oc-
curred to "beyond" the 1990s.
162 Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 75.
164 Thompson, supra note 15, at 300.
164 Smith, supra note 45, at 237-38.
165 Thompson, supra note 15, at 300. Dedicating use of
the orbit-spectrum to developing countries, which is less effi-
cient and economical, contravenes the principle of efficient
and economic use. Id. See discussion infra Part D.
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suits of its space activities."' 66 The former Soviet
Union expressed the opinion that the "mankind
provisions [in Article 1] have no precise defini-
tion" and that countries' outer space activities en-
tirely "depended on their Will."'1 6 7 Although the
statements accompanying ratification by devel-
oped countries essentially are made for political
value, these statements show a lack of support for
interpreting the equitable access clause to require
sharing. Edwin Paxon concurs in stating that na-
tions "are under no definite obligation to share
anything beyond what they think is reasona-
ble." '
68
Many developed countries and private entities
put forward tremendous effort and expense to es-
tablish satellite systems. However, this does not
automatically mean that they have no responsibil-
ity to underdeveloped countries. Concepts of fair-
ness and justice underlying the principle of equi-
table access require addressing the concerns of
developing countries.' 69 For one thing, developed
countries must not act to deprive developing
countries of access to orbit-spectrum, so long as,
developing countries are ready to exploit the re-
source. Furthermore, the ITU affirmatively places
the burden on developed countries to support the
growth of the developing countries' telecommuni-
cations capabilities. 170 One way developed coun-
tries can provide positive support is through the
World Bank, which assists developing countries
with improving telecommunications capabilities.
For example, in 1994 the World Bank assisted
Uganda in acquiring a national cellular license.17
Despite the apparent lack of special provisions
to allow developing countries to acquire access to
the orbit-spectrum, which may fuel a quest for an
a priori system, plenty of opportunities exist for de-
166 Husby, supra note 142, at 364.
167 Id.
168 Edwin W. Paxson, III, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space
Exploration: Space Law and Economic Development, 14 Mici. J.
INT'L L. 487, 491-92 (1993).
169 See Smith, supra note 45, at 245.
170 See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 32.
171 SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 10.
172 INTELSAT, Agreement and Operating Agreement
Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization "INTELSAT", Sept. 17, 1971, 10 I.L.M. The pre-
amble of the INTELSAT Agreement indicates that the organ-
ization was formed tinder the principle that "outer space
shall be used for the benefit and in the interest of all coun-
tries." Id.
173 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 63.
174 INTELSAT Approves Privatization Plan,
veloping countries to access orbit spectrum. Until
recently, one opportunity was membership in IN-
TELSAT, a multinational organization created for
the purpose of developing the orbit-spectrum and
making it available to all countries. 72 INTELSAT
membership was open to all ITU members,
173
which comprised 144 member nations as of its
privatization on July 18, 2001.174 INTELSAT "pro-
vide[d] two-thirds of the world's public satellite
telecommunications services" in the mid 1990s.1
75
Each member country contributed "at least 0.05%
of the valuation of the organization upon join-
ing."' 176 Thereafter, each country "must make reg-
ular contributions" depending on its amount of
orbit-spectrum use. 177 When a country, or a pri-
vate entity applying through its country, sought
access to INTELSAT's network, INTELSAT as-
sessed various technical factors in determining
how best to provide for the needs of the applying
country. INTELSAT's network provides an afford-
able alternative for developing countries to access
orbit spectrum and fulfill their telecommunica-
tions needs. 178 Although INTELSAT has been
privatized, it still strives to provide access to satel-
lite services for all countries.' 79 In fact, the Inter-
national Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion, a separate and independent intergovern-
mental agency, monitors how well INTELSAT is
fulfilling its public service goals. 180 Arrangements
with INTELSAT, however, do not provide a devel-
oping country the independence and prestige af-
forded by a national satellite system. Yet, INTEL-
SAT remains an option until a country is finan-
cially and technically ready to operate its own sys-
tem. Another option for developing countries is
to subscribe to the services of other private prov-
iders.' 8 '
St'ACEANDTECII.COM, at http://www.spaceandtech.com/di-
gest/sd2000-36/sd2000-36-003.shtml (May 28, 2001) [herein-
after Privatization Plan].
175 Delzeit & Beal, supra note 14, at 78. Currently, IN-
TELSAT operates 21 satellites. INTELSAT, FLEET, at http://
www.intelsat.com/satellites.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2001). Its
affiliate, New Skies Satellites, N.V., operates five satellites.
NEW SKIES SATELLITES N.V., ABOUT NEW SKIES FLEET, at http:/
/www.newskies.com/PBFleet/fleet-front.asp (last visited on
Sept. 19, 2001).
176 KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 1, at 71.
177 Id. at 72.
17' REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 144, at 215.
179 Privatization Plan, supra note 174.
180 Id.
181 Mike Mills, Ready to Launch a Global Radio Network,
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1998, at F5-7. WorldSpace, a satellite
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C. Cooperation With Due Regard for
Corresponding Interests
The Space Treaty's requirements for coopera-
tion and mutual assistance among countries and
the ITC's requirements for harmonization and
the coordination ensure cooperation with due re-
gard for corresponding interests are a critical
component of the ITU's regulatory system. Al-
though it may be argued that an a priori system
could fulfill this principle through planning, it is
now fulfilled by the current a posteriori system,
which has the critical coordination procedure to
prevent interference. An a posteriori system's coor-
dination process directly requires cooperation
and mutual assistance among countries to prevent
interference. A central authority that dictates
courses of action would contradict the spirit of co-
operation and mutual assistance in the a posteriori
system. Furthermore, an a priori system is a more
authoritative method that could result in arbitrary
evaluations. Certain types of activities, such as in-
ternational aviation regulation, may require a
more authoritative approach because of signifi-
cant safety issues, complex flight procedures and
numerous actors' involvement. On the other
hand, satellite use does not raise significant safety
issues and usually only two parties are involved in
any dispute. When the dispute arises from inter-
ference, it is directly within the interest of those
two parties to find a solution, and it is a waste of
resources for others to support what is primarily
in the interest of the two parties. The recent con-
flicts involving interference demonstrate how im-
portant it is for countries to cooperate and coor-
dinate their frequencies. 8 2 The conflicts also
demonstrate that revisions to the regulatory sys-
tem are needed, particularly enforcement op-
tions, which are explored in Section V.
D. Efficient and Economic Operation
The principle of efficient and economic opera-
tion is closely related to the principle of coopera-
service provider, was formed with the specific intent of mar-
keting to developing countries, especially Africa, India,
China and the Americas. The company offers broadcasting
services, not just interactive telecommunications services.
WorldSpace's current satellite fleet serves Africa and Asia; it
plans to launch the "AmeriStar" satellite to serve the United
States. This service provides an example of developing coun-
tries fulfilling their satellite communication needs by leasing
a channel. See, e.g., WorldSpace.com at www.worldspace.com
tion because coordination of the orbit-spectrum
promotes efficient and economic orbit-spectrum
use. For example, two satellites in close proximity
transmitting on the same frequencies may cause
each other harmful interference, potentially
preventing successful operation of each satellite
system. Lack of coordination would not only re-
sult in the inefficient use of the orbit-spectrum by
effectively leaving precious orbital positions un-
used, but could even entirely prevent use of the
orbit-spectrum as fully debilitating interference
may result. Therefore, whether or not an a priori
or a posteriori system is used, the principle of coop-
eration is necessary both in theory and practice.
The principles of efficient and economic opera-
tion, however, are distinguished from the princi-
ple of cooperation in that these sometimes con-
tradictory principles assist in defining what type of
regulatory system should be used for the orbit-
spectrum. A regulatory system, based on efficient
and economic principles, focuses on obtaining
the most use out of the resource at the lowest pos-
sible cost. In other words, preventing orbit-spec-
trum from remaining fallow while demand and
technology make use possible.
Advocates of an a priori system might suggest
that an a priori system would be more efficient
since it requires careful planning of how orbit-
spectrum is utilized; such planning could seek to
optimize the spacing of satellites and the assign-
ment of frequencies. To the extent that planning
could benefit utilization of the orbit-spectrum by
maximizing the number of satellites in GSO while
making the greatest use of the spectrum through
technical analysis, these arguments may have
some merit. However, with such a large presence
already in GSO, however, an a priori system as ad-
vocated for the benefit of the developing coun-
tries, in which positions are reserved for individ-
ual countries, fails to promote efficiency and
economy. Most developing countries use of the
GSO is or would be less efficient than developed
countries' use of it.183 Furthermore, a
(last visited Sept. 3, 2001).
182 See infta pp. 207-09.
183 Many developing countries do not have the technol-
ogy or cannot afford the improved antennas and transmitters
that allow smaller distances among satellites. Many develop-
ing countries with large rural areas favor use of small, inex-
pensive antennas, even though these antenna types require a
stronger signal from the satellite. But stronger signals require
more space among satellites; the result is a less efficient use
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jurimetric 18 4 analysis of channel depth for trans-
mission at various frequencies demonstrates that
an a posteriori system, and not an a priori system,
provides for the most efficient and economic use
of the orbit-spectrum. 185 Moreover, proponents of
a posteriori system contend that this system pro-
vides a market solution to the orbit-spectrum,
which will yield the most efficient and economic
use. 186
It might be contested that the free market actu-
ally supports the actions of Tonga in leasing out
the allotments because through market mecha-
nisms Tonga has merely transferred rights to a dif-
ferent user, while not diminishing the efficiency
of the resource. In fact, the FCC has been advo-
cating and developing rules for secondary mar-
kets for domestic use of the radio spectrum in the
United States. This effort is aimed at encouraging
the maximum use of spectrum that has been li-
censed, yet remains unused. 187 To the extent that
there is value in advocating the free market and
encouraging the use of fallow spectrum, it must
also be noted that, first, leasing allotments clearly
contradicts the non-appropriation principle. Sec-
ond, a practice of leasing would decrease the
overall efficiency of the market in terms of cost to
the end-user. The increased costs associated with
deploying a satellite system by paying an addi-
tional $2 million, for example, is a burden that
will be shifted to those who gain access to the sys-
tem (just as the massive auction costs yielding bil-
lions of dollars for wireless spectrums in Europe
and the United States will be passed on to end-
users, particularly if costs increase from acquiring
profit margins by leasing radio spectrum rights to
another provider). The foreseeable result with re-
of the orbit spectrum. See Smith, supra note 45, at 241 & n.62.
184 Jurimetrics is the application of quantitative methods
to legal decision-making. Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 70; see
generally AndrewLaw.com, at http://www.andrewlaw.com/
jurimetrics.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2002).
185 Maximum channel dispersion is an international le-
gal principle based on economic and efficient operation of
the orbit-spectrum pursuant to the Space Treaty and the ITC.
Channel dispersion is a function of three dimensions: depth,
distribution and directionality. Applying a formal quantita-
tive analysis to each dimension demonstrates that maximum
channel dispersion is achieved with an a posteriori system, not
with the a priori system. With respect to depth, the a posteriori
track allows 500 MHz per orbital position, whereas the a priori
system allows only 2.3 MHz per orbital position. With respect
to distribution, the a posteriori system provides "about twice as
much" as the a priori system. It is only with respect to direc-
tionality where the a priori system is comparable to the a pos-
teriori system because the value is the same for both. Roth-
spect to satellite service is that unrestrained mar-
ket mechanisms will create inefficiencies and de-
crease equitable access for the developing coun-
tries.18 8 If a developing country sought to deploy
its own satellite system, additional costs would be
incurred from lease agreements, impeding the
system's deployment. Or, if the developing coun-
try purchased services from an implemented sys-
tem, which incorporated a leased allotment, the
price would be higher than it would have been
without a lease.
Although the principle of efficient and eco-
nomic operation and the principle of equitable
access may not be in harmony, of the two princi-
ples, greater force ought to be given to the princi-
ples of efficient and economic operation. As dis-
cussed above, there are various options for the de-
veloping countries seeking to gain access to the
orbit-spectrum. On the other hand, there are very
limited means for accomplishing the efficient and
economic operation of the orbit-spectrum. Be-
cause orbit-spectrum is such a scarce resource and
demand is increasing, it is critical to harness as
much of this resource as possible. Deference to
the principle of efficient and economic operation
will best lead to an adequate supply of satellite ser-
vice without unduly limiting developing nations'
access to orbit-spectrum.
E. Additional Support for the A Posteriori
System
International law, as established by custom, sup-
ports the continuation of the a posteriori system for
regulating orbit-spectrum use. 189 Additionally, the
customary international law of a posteriori regula-
blatt, supra note 2, at 72.
186 D. da Empoli, Market Versus Non-market Decisions for the
Global Commons: The Case of the Orbit-Spectrum Resource, THE Fu-
TURE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONs 2337, 2339
(UMBERTO LEANZA ed., 1993).
187 In re Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through
Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary
Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 24203,
para 18 (2000) (proposing regulations for "the development
of more robust secondary markets in radio spectrum usage
rights").
188 Thompson, supra note 15, at 308-09.
189 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 175 (Feb. 20, 1969) (dissenting opinion
of Judge Tanaka). Judge Tanaka explained that two ele-
ments, corpus and animus, must be fulfilled for a particular
practice to constitute customary international law. The
corpus, a "quantitative factor .... constitutes a usage or a con-
tinuous repetition of the same kinds of acts." The animus is a
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tion may also be binding on nations that are not
signatories to the Space Treaty or ITU mem-
bers.' 90 From the U.S. perspective, the 1984 Com-
mercial Space Launch Act ("Launch Act") sup-
ports implementation of an a posteriori system
more than an a priori system.' 9 1 The Launch Act's
purpose is to "promote economic growth and en-
trepreneurial activity through utilization of the
space environment for peaceful purposes." 192 Be-
cause an a priori system would limit access to the
orbit-spectrum, its implementation would not pro-
mote outer space use; rather, the a posteriori sys-
tem would allow for greater access, flexibility, and
opportunity for entrepreneurial activity.
V. REFORMATION OF THE REGULATORY
SYSTEM
The increase in conflicts over the orbit-spec-
trum has led observers to call for revisions to the
regulatory system.' 93 Recent demands have not
been for a shift towards an a priori system, but
have been for changes to the current a posteriori
system. How successful revisions to the a posteriori
system are will depend on resolving critical issues,
such as the creation of paper satellites, interfer-
ence problems and administrative costs.
Recent changes in the a posterioi system ad-
dressed the problems of paper satellites and ad-
ministrative costs. 19 4 To address the problem of
paper satellites, the ITU decreased the maximum
amount of time that an orbital position can be re-
"qualitative factor" that looks to the subjective, motivating
force behind state action, which reflects a binding legal obli-
gation-"opinion juris sive." Subjective intent may be identi-
fied from numerous signatories to the Space Treaty and the
ITC recognizing a binding legal obligation to the principles
articulated in therein. Utilization of the a posteriori system has
certainly been a continuing, prevalent practice in the inter-
national community. Also, the a posteriori system was utilized
from the beginning, prior to any regulatory system, when
Sputnik was placed into orbit without any planning of the use
of the orbit-spectrum.
190 See BUERGENIT-AL & MAIER, supra note 140, at 24. Cus-
tomary international law will not be binding on a nation if
that nation consistently rejected the practice embodied in
the custom or formally "contracts out of customary interna-
tional law." Id.
191 98 Stat. 3055 (1984).
192 49 U.S.C. §70101 (b) (1) (1994).
193 Roberts, supra note 7, at 1136 (summarizing pro-
posed reforms); Jennifer A. Manner, A Survey: WRC- 2000 &
IMT -2000 the Search for Global Spectrum, 9 CoMMLAw CON-
sPEcrus 5, 9-22 (2001) (analyzing various points of view ad-
vocated at the World Radiocommunications Conference in
2000).
served through advanced publication before ac-
tual implementation of the satellite from nine
years to seven years.' 95 Moreover, the ITU devel-
oped the due diligence requirements to increase
the likelihood that the applicant has contracted
for the manufacturing of a satellite for the publi-
cized orbital slot. At the WRC 2000 in Istanbul,
Turkey, satellite industry stakeholders reviewed
administrative and financial due diligence re-
quirements. 196 Financial due diligence has met
significant resistance because it may impose high
costs; thus impeding the ability of developing na-
tions to deploy a satellite system. As these changes
for dealing with paper satellites have been re-
cently implemented, it may be too early to fully
assess the success of these revisions; yet, early indi-
cations from the WRC 2000 are that administra-
tive due diligence has limited the number of frivo-
lous filings. Although a good step, the changes do
not go far enough. Paper satellites infringe on the
restriction against national appropriation in space
and on the efficient and economic use of space by
unnecessarily reserving positions that could be
immediately used by another party. Paper satel-
lites need to be further curtailed; to accomplish
this, more stringent regulations are necessary. For
example, the seven-year period is still too long, it
should be shorter. The appropriate length of sat-
ellite deployment depends on what is reasonably
necessary to complete the coordination process,
assuming all states cooperate. 197 Assuming a coop-
erative coordination process, with the industry's
194 Roberts, supra note 7, at 1130.
195 Id.
196 Administrative due diligence "information includes
identity of the satellite network, name of the administration,
country symbol, frequency band(s), name of operator, name
of satellite, orbital characteristics, name of the satellite manu-
facturer, date of execution of the contract, contractual deliv-
ery date, number of satellites procured, name of the launch
vehicle provider, date of execution of the contract for launch
services, a launch or in-orbit delivery window, name of the
launch vehicle and name and location of the launch facility."
WRC2000 Highlights, No. 11, May 19, 2000 at http://
www.itu.int/newsarchive/wrc2000/releases/22may.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2002). Financial due diligence could require
payment of "deposit of one percent of the cost of building
and launching a satellite" so as to "deter frivolous filings."
WRC2000 Highlights, No. 3, May 9, 2000 at http://
www.itu.int/newsarchive/wrc2000/releases/1Omay.html (last
visited Feb 3, 2002).
197 See infra Part III.B. The amount of time should be rel-
atively short because cooperation and mutual assistance are




increasingly proficient technical and manufactur-
ing capabilities, five years would be sufficient time
to deploy a satellite into an orbital location. Addi-
tionally, the ITU should be given the power to in-
vestigate whether submitted due diligence infor-
mation is true and accurate. If it is determined
that the information was both material and mis-
leading, a special multinational panel should de-
termine whether to automatically void the regis-
tration/reservation. Another possibility for deter-
ring paper satellites is to require applicants to file
a deposit equal to a percentage19 of the satellite's
value or a set fee.199 This might be criticized, how-
ever, as discriminatory against developing nations
and small companies that do not have readily
available capital. This could be partly solved by
smaller companies offering collateral in the satel-
lite or in company assets as a good faith gesture,
but this may prove terribly complex to administer.
Furthermore, it may discourage developing coun-
tries and small companies that are willing enter
into a risky venture, but are unwilling to lose cor-
porate assets in case a good-faith effort to launch
a satellite fails. This, in turn, could be put under
the scrutiny of a multinational panel to make a
good-faith determination, yet such a determina-
tion could lead to a complex and undesirable ad-
ministrative task. In any case, the shorter waiting
period and due diligence enforcement are fair
and effective means for destroying paper satel-
lites.
The concern for administrative costs arose from
developing countries' view that their ITU fees sub-
sidized developed nations' satellite programs, not
developing nations' efforts to launch satellites. 2°°
Requiring each country that files an advanced
publication for an orbital slot to pay a set fee will
rectify this concern. Although this fee might have
some effect on slowing the creation of paper satel-
lites, the ITU clearly stated that the fee is required
only to address the needs of administrative costs
and to avoid the subsidization complained of by
developing countries. The value of this new regu-
lation has not yet been traced, but it appears to be
a good step in the direction of continuing to fund
198 Proposed percentages range from 1% to 2%. Crowded
Orbital Slots Test ITU's Influence, SPACE NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997,
1997 WL 9051757.
199 Roberts, supra note 7, at 1132-34. The chances for a
financial solution are slim because the ITU determined not
to take such an approach at the 1997 WRC meeting. Individ-
ual nations, however, are likely to raise the issue at future
the ITU's increasingly complex tasks and to ad-
dress developing nations' complaints. If there
continue to be fiscal problems, the ITU could
raise general fees as well as the case-by-case regis-
tration fees.
One of the greatest concerns that remains un-
resolved is a coordination problem between satel-
lite providers. In part there is no need for in-
creased regulation of the coordination process be-
cause it is clearly in the best interest of two indi-
vidual satellite providers to coordinate, for with-
out coordination, both will experience interfer-
ence. It is only through coordination of frequen-
cies that both providers can achieve interference
free signals. Yet, what about the cases where a pro-
vider purposefully jams the signal of another pro-
vider or where one provider places a satellite into
an orbital position before the provider registered
for that position launches it own satellite into the
position?
These are problems that even the new regula-
tions are likely to fail to properly resolve. Instead
a meaningful enforcement mechanism is neces-
sary to achieve satisfactory results. Unfortunately,
the ITU lacks any enforcement power. At least
two options are possible, one currently existing
and the other is not. The existing option is for the
nation, which espoused on behalf of the ag-
grieved party during the registration process, to
bring the case before the International Court of
Justice. 20 1 The other, not yet existing option is for
the ITU to establish a judicial body with enforce-
ment powers. The decisions of this judicial body
would be binding on the nations that espoused on
behalf of the parties during the registration pro-
cess. The situation in either an International
Court of Justice case or in an ITU judicial case
becomes more difficult to resolve if the accused
party did not use the national channel to register,
but simply launched without any kind of contact
with the ITU. Recall, a number of countries that
are not ITU members, therefore, are not bound
by the ITC's requirements. 2°2 Yet, it could be ar-
gued that a combination of the treaties and cus-
tomary international law developed through the
conferences.
200 ITU to Charge Satellite Operators For System Modification
Services, SATELLITE WEEK, July 14, 1997, 1997 WL 8577890.
201 Richard Berkley, Space Law Versus Space Utilization: The
Inhibition of Private Industry in Outer Space, 15 Wis. INT'L L.J.
421, 435, (1997).
202 See infra pp. 212-14.
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repeated practice of following ITU procedures is
binding on ITU nonmember states. Despite this
potential complication, all major satellite powers
are ITU members. Thus, an internal ITU judicial
body could, in effect, operate within the satellite
community.
There are some substantial adjustments that
could be made to the a posteriori system, which in-
corporate an a pfiori system's planning character-
istic, hinting at the evolution of a hybrid system.
The primary aim of such adjustments is to ensure
efficient and economic operation of the orbit-
spectrum through competitive innovation. At the
same time, equitable access would be ensured, al-
lowing companies or countries that do not pres-
ently have the capability of launching satellites
into GSO to develop such capabilities.
At the heart of the proposed adjustments is a
transparent competitive bidding procedure simi-
lar to that used for public procurements. As posi-
tions in the GSO become increasingly scarce, a
newly formed ITU technical body would assess
and identify the frequency potential for a given
slot. Rather than using the current system where
the first provider to launch a satellite into that po-
sition acquires rights to that position, the sug-
gested approach would permit several providers
interested in the same position to submit competi-
tive bids. The ITU would review bids under two
circumstances: when the applicants seek an open
position and when they seek a position that has
been permanently abandoned. The bids would be
accepted and reviewed by the newly formed ITU
technical body. A precise and publicized scoring
system for the various factors would be used to
avoid accusations of discrimination. The following
are some factors that may be considered: which
provider could get a satellite into that position at
the earliest date; which satellite would have the
longest life span; which provider would maximize
channel dispersion at that particular position;
which satellite would cause the least risk for inter-
ference with the surrounding satellites; which sat-
ellite would potentially benefit the largest number
of end-users; and which proposal would contrib-
203 See, e.g., Teledesic.com, at http://www.teledesic.com
(last visited Feb. 3, 2002). Where technology reaches its limit
with respect to use of orbit-spectrum, new opportunities will
arise. For example, Teledesic utilizes low-Earth-orbit (LEO)
satellites to establish a communications network. LEO satel-
lites operate at low altitudes and are not in geosynchronous
orbit. They are typically integrated into a multi-satellite net-
ute the most to a large satellite network. This is a
non-exhaustive list; the primary object of using a
bidding system is to squeeze as much out of the
orbit-spectrum as possible for the benefit of the
greatest number of people during a given time
period.
A more difficult challenge is to determine a re-
sponse to a provider that plans to continue opera-
tions in a position with a new satellite replacing a
disposed satellite when other providers wish to
use that slot. Because the original provider may
have incurred great expense in developing its sat-
ellite service and that particular position may be
critical for networking with other satellites, it
would be both unfair and wasteful to open that
position to bidding. Furthermore, it is highly un-
likely that a proposition to open such'positions to
bidding would be supported by the telecommuni-
cations community and developed countries. It is
developing countries that might be more support-
ive of the opportunity to bid on positions under
assignment. But the simple wish of one country to
use what is already being used by another country
is insufficient to pass the right of use. There might
be one opportunity, under an adjusted system, for
countries to acquire such positions. The ITU
should assess a temporarily vacated position and
establish minimum technical requirements re-
garding frequency use, interference and channel
dispersion for the particular use of that position.
If the original provider fails to meet the minimum
requirements for its new satellite, then, under the
principle of efficient and economic operation,
the ITU should open the position for bidding, at
which point both developed and developing
countries could bid to provide the most efficient
and innovative satellite service for the available
position.
There may be some concern about putting such
a strong emphasis on technology. As mentioned,
the orbit-spectrum is a technology-bound re-
source with no predetermined limits to define
how technology will allow providers to harness the
orbit-spectrum resource. 203 Also, the power of
technology with respect to issues on the interna-
work, or constellation, so as to provide wide coverage and
consistent service. Id.; see also Mike Mills, Haig Floats a High-
Tech Trial Balloon: Firm Looks Skyward to Different Satellite,
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1998, at F5. Another alternative, involv-
ing former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, is Sky Station
International, which is planning to launch huge, robotic,
high-altitude, zeppelins (High Altitude Platform Systems,
2002]
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tional scale has gained increased recognition. 21 1 4
Article 9 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development states: "States should cooperate
to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for
sustainable development by improving scientific
understanding through exchanges of scientific
and technological knowledge, and by enhancing
the development, adaptation, diffusion and trans-
fer of technologies, including new and innovative
technologies. 2
0 5
Regulation via technology can both operate to
preserve-or better utilize-the environment,
and it can operate as a "technology-forcing"
mechanism.2116 In regard to preserving or better
utilizing the environment, a minimal technologi-
cal standard that is already achievable, but not yet
uniformly implemented, could operate to achieve
a minimum standard of efficiency.207 A technol-
ogy forcing approach can stimulate research and
development by setting a standard that has not yet
been achieved. For example, the 1970 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act required automobile
manufacturers to meet certain numerical stan-
dards for fuel efficiency and auto emissions, how-
ever, the auto industry had not developed the
technology to meet those standards and maintain
market prices for cars.20° This mandate com-
pelled intensive research to develop such technol-
"HAPS") over major cities. Sky Station plans to transmit sig-
nals for Internet data transmission, telephone calls and video
transmission. Mr. Haig's partners include Harry Darlington,
the president of the Ozone Society, and Martine Rothblatt,
whose work is referred to herein. It is expected that as many
as 250 HAPS will be deployed, with initial deployment
planned for 2002. See generally, SkyStation.com, at http://
www.skystation.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
204 DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW AND POLICY 65-81 (1998) [hereinafter DAVID
HUNTER] (discussing technological development with respect
to sustainable world growth).
205 Id. at 308.
206 Id. at 73-74.
207 This raises a problem of quantity versus quality. The
ogy until the standards were reached and sur-
passed. Likewise, setting standards and promoting
competition for the orbit-spectrum will stimulate
research and development in the satellite field.
This innovation in technology will lead to more
efficient orbit-spectrum use, potentially benefiting
a large number of people.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, utilization
of the orbit-spectrum with satellites has been
growing and evolving rapidly. Currently, the inter-
national satellite community is faced with new
challenges without obvious solutions, but familiar
legal principles offer guidance. It is critical to not
only deal with the current problems quickly, but
to do so with a view toward future challenges. Be-
cause access to the orbit-spectrum is likely to be-
come scarcer and satellite technology more so-
phisticated, efficient utilization and emerging
technologies are good starting points for evaluat-
ing and revising the current regulatory system.
Not only will this benefit the satellite community,
but it will contribute to the growth of space law in
general, which will become increasingly relied
upon as we reach toward the stars.
orbit-spectrum has different types of satellites. Some are built
to transmit massive amounts of information; others, such as
U.S. military remote-sensing satellites, transmit relatively
small amounts of specialized data. Not surprisingly, devel-
oped countries with specialized satellites performing national
security tasks are unlikely to abandon these positions for
satellites that merely transmit huge amounts of raw data,
even if it is done efficiently. No obvious solution exists to this
problem in the context of a revised, technologically-guided
bidding system. A possible approach is to defer to the first-in-
time, first-in-right principle for non-commercial satellites that
provide a critical service, including national security, geologi-
cal/oceanographic remote-sensing and weather data.
208 DAVID HUNTER, supra note 204, at 74; see also Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).
[Vol. 10
